

## **The Trade of the Ya'ariba State in the Arabian Gulf and Their Relation with European Powers during the Seventeenth Century**

**Dr.Abd-Al Razzak Mahmoud Al-Maani**

**Dr. Mohammad Abdel Hadi Al Jazi**

Al Hussein Bin Talal University

### **Abstract**

The 17<sup>th</sup> century was an important period for the Arabian Gulf Region in general, and for Oman in particular. During that time, Oman's history saw the establishment of Al-Yuearibain 1624. That State was in long lasting wars with the Portuguese who had occupied Oman's lands in 1507 until they were forced out by the Arabs in 1650. The Arabs further chased them away to East Africa and India. It could also establish a great naval force in the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, it could make trade relations to the farthest extent, especially with the Dutch and English.

The research also followed the relationship of the Europeans to the coast of Oman, starting with the Portuguese and passing through the English and the Dutch, as these forces were driven by their commercial interests, which they tried to achieve in one way or another, but their Arab residents were more desperate in defending their water and land because of their association with it, as it is the land and a resource livelihood.

**Key words:** (Oman, Al-Yueariba, European powers, Trade)

## " تجارة دولة اليعاربة في الخليج العربي وعلاقتها بالقوى الأوروبية خلال القرن السابع عشر "

### الملخص

تعد فترة القرن السابع عشر الميلادي فترة مهمة بالنسبة لتاريخ الخليج العربي بصورة عامة وعمان بصورة خاصة، حيث امتاز تاريخ عُمان خلال هذه الفترة بقيام دولة اليعاربة عام 1624، تلك الدولة التي دخلت في حروب طويلة مع البرتغاليين الذين احتلوا أراضي عُمان عام 1507، حتى أُخرجوا منها بيد عربية عام 1650. وطاردهم حتى شرقي إفريقية والهند، وقدر لها أيضاً أن تُنشئ قوة بحرية كبيرة في النصف الثاني من القرن السابع عشر. كما أنها استطاعت أن تُكوّن علاقات تجارية امتدت إلى أوسع مدى، وبخاصة مع الهولنديين والإنجليز.

وتتبع البحث أيضاً، علاقة الأوروبيين بساحل عُمان، ابتداءً من البرتغاليين ومروراً بالإنجليز والهولنديين، حيث كانت هذه القوى مدفوعة وراء مصالحها التجارية، التي حاولت تحقيقها بصورة أو بأخرى، ولكن سكانها العرب، كانوا أكثر استماتة في الدفاع عن مياههم وأرضهم لارتباطهم بها، فهي الأرض ومورد الرزق.

الكلمات المفتاحية: (عُمان، اليعاربة، القوى الأوروبية، التجارة).

## 1. Introduction:

The Arabian Gulf has a unique geographic location controlling the trade passages. It has allowed Arabs to have an expansive trade activity via several land and sea routes since ever. It went east to India and China, and west to Iraq, Persia and Levant, then to the Mediterranean Sea, Europe, Egypt and East Africa coasts.

During the 17<sup>th</sup> century and the following centuries, Oman became important for trade due to several factors: the first factor was its geographic location and its effect on the rise of Oman as an important power at both trade and marine levels over the rest of international and local powers. The other factor was Omani people's interest in ship making and development, as well as Oman's interest in being armed against dangers to which it might have been exposed, especially during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. Oman had had a long history of the art of navigation and its traders and navigators went through seas and oceans at the time when the world was still relying on small boats. This indicates Omanis were popular as navigators and traders from the begging of their history, thanks to their proficiency and skills of ship making (Kazem, 2004; p.98).

Thanks to its strategic location, calm waters and good trade position, Oman gained economic and political importance that helped Omanis play their trade and navigational role. Al-Yueariba, followed by Al-Por Said, further contributed to the trade activity increase by allowing foreign traders to freely do their business and trade activities.


The Arabs continued to transfer the traditional trade. They also benefited from transit trade between the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, passing through the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. The trade was concentrated in Arab Hormuz Kingdom, Oman, Bahrain and Basra. This remained until the arrival of the Portuguese colonialists that dominated the trade routes and centers in 1507 until Muscat was liberated in 1650.

The Portuguese blocked the passage of any merchant ships in the Arabian Gulf without their permits. They also concluded agreements with domestic traders and Region rulers. Thus, they could control the eastern spice trade, which hugely affected the Arab traders in the Region. The foregoing led to the decline of the economic situations that majorly relied on the trade movement, despite the military safeguard expenses of the Portuguese in Muscat exceeded the profits or trade income. The income of British agency in Muscat was around

67,125,000 *Pardaws*, while the Military safeguarding expenses of Muscat were 20,925.000 *Pardaws*. (Al Ediros, Arabian Gulf Economic History).

The Arabian Gulf region became a battleground for the Portuguese, Arabian and Ottoman forces on one hand, then between the Portuguese and English forces on the other hand. This remained the case until the early 18<sup>th</sup> century when the Portuguese had to withdraw from the Region. There was a rivalry between the English and Dutch forces for taking control over the navigation passages and trade in the Arabian Gulf Region. The rivalry appeared when the Portuguese started getting weak. Subsequently joined by the French, that rivalry became tougher in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and the English became in a clear advantage over their rivals in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century.

The Gulf Arabs' efforts changed from trade activity to resisting the Portuguese power throughout the occupation time until liberation. This was followed by a competition with other European powers that came to the East waters in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century. Those powers were Dutch and English forces. Their main objective was to directly get and export oriental goods to Europe so they no longer rely on the role played by the Portuguese and other traders in this field. However, Oman Arabs' power originated from Al-Yueariba who forced the Portuguese out and established a strong navy could stop the new European power from having a political dominance throughout Al-Yueariba's rule for fearing their fleet. The Region inhabitants then entered again into a new confrontation of this colonialism, but there was a margin through which Arab traders could carry on their activities and continue their economic movement.



THE GULF IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

## 2. The Ya'ariba State and the Arab Gulf Trade:

Oman's history in the 17<sup>th</sup> century saw the establishment of Al-Yueariba's State in 1624. It entered into long-lasting wars with the Portuguese who occupied Oman's island in 1507 and remained until 1650 when they were forced out. Moreover, Al-Yueariba State chased the Portuguese until East Africa and India, and it could establish a big navy in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.(Al-Maani 2001, p.67).

When the Portuguese dominated the Arabian Gulf Region, in the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Oman was ruled by Imam Mohammad bin Ismail (1500-1530), who stirred up the Ibadi Imamate. After his death in 1530, he was succeeded by his son Imam Barakat. Imam Mohammad and his son could defeat Al Nabhanien, who ruled Oman for a long time. The State was divided at that time among Ibadi Imams on one hand, and Al Nabhanien Sultans on the other hand. The division's extended and tribal leaderships led by Bano-Jaber and Bano-Hilal emerged at the same time spreading a disorder and civil wars that lasted until the rise of Al-Yueariba State (Al Azkawi, 1986, p.75.IbnRuzaiq, P. 250).

In those circumstances, the Portuguese took control over the main ports of Oman, such as Qrayyat, Muscat, Matrah, Sahar and KhorFakkan. Those ports remained under their control until the fall of Hormuz in 1622 when the Portuguese took new steps to tighten their political and trading grip on those ports.

Since trade and pearl hunting were the backbone of the Omani economic life over the ages, the Omanis had to confront the Portuguese when they controlled them, depriving the native inhabitants of their living sources and seizing the profits generated from trade. This matter was clear in the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century when the Portuguese influence became weaker in comparison with the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Al Khateeb says in that regard: "The people in power (in Oman) started thinking of continuing their strife against the Portuguese who occupied the strategic sites on the Omani Coast. They clamped down on the Arab Omanis' navigation and trade activity. They also levied high taxes on the Arabian ships coming from Muscat. The ships were further subjected to intensive search by the Portuguese garrisons in the Gulf waters (Al Azkawi, 1986; p.106).

The Portuguese committed other acts to cut off the Omanis cities' supplies, just because Oman was in competition with their trade dominance or political influence. The historical incidents indicate that the Omani City of Sahar was under the control of some Arab tribal powers in 1616. Once the Portuguese felt it, they prepared a fleet from their bases in the Indian Ocean and India, then besieged the city and set fire in its buildings. The pretext of the Portuguese to do so was that Sahar Port became a competitive trade center for Muscat Port that was under their control. They noticed a drop in their incoming custom tariff and that most merchant ships use Sahar Port, so they made such cruel and harmful decision (Willson, 1982; p.53; Al Khateeb, 1981; p. 107).

Therefore, it can be said that the political disagreement in Oman and the economic difficulty arising out of the loss of economic resources based on sea created a collective wish to get out of those situations. Thus, Omanis agreed to elect an Imam who can rid them of their suffering. The chosen Imam was Nasir bin Murshid AlYa'arubi in 1624.

To know about the trade activity of Oman during Al-Yueariba dynasty's regime, Al-Yueariba's most popular imams and the role they played in trade, as well as their relations

with foreign countries and influence of such relations on Omani trade during the 17<sup>th</sup> century should be studied.

### **2.1 .Nasir bin Murshid(1624-1649):**

Imam Nasir bin Murshid is the most known Imam of Al-Yueariba in Oman and he was the founder of Al-Yueariba State in Oman. His election was a significant turning point, not only in Oman's history, but in the Arabian Gulf as well. During his term, the State entered into a new stage and could reach an unprecedented power and glory. He concentrated his efforts on the unification of the State and the dominance of the majority of areas that had been controlled by the rival tribal powers to be ruled by a powerful central authority, then to fight the Portuguese (Amin, 1973, p.652).

Those steps were necessary for the State. Iman Nasir bin Murshid wanted to strengthen his home front to stand as strong support for him in his wars against the Portuguese who moved their main base from Hormuz, after it had fallen in 1622, to Omani coasts where they aimed at controlling their cities and people. However, in Wilson's opinion, that step taken by the Portuguese was not in their interest, as "Muscat garrison was not a navy garrison like Hormuz; it was rather exposed to strikes from the back, i.e., Oman's revolting people" (Amin, 1973,).

Iman Nasir could make his military bases a serious source of concern for the Portuguese. His military operations were launched from them in the 3<sup>rd</sup> decade of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The first one was in 1623 when Al-Yueariba launched irregular raids on Muscat, the Portuguese stronghold, and did a severe damage to the Portuguese who had not expected them (Al Khateeb, 1981.p112).

The Omanis attacks on the ports occupied by the Portuguese were continued. They attacked Julfar (Ras Al Khaimah) and forced the Portuguese out of it in 1633. They attacked Sahar and Muscat and disturbed the Portuguese in Muscat pushing them to seek peace with the Omanis (IbnQaysar, P.51).

In the following year, the Omanis attacked and recaptured Sour and Qrayyat. There remained no Portuguese coastal pockets but Sahar and Muscat that saw a fight over them in the 1640s, as the Omanis attacks on them were intensified. In 1643, the Omanis could take control over Sahar (Al Hamdani, 1984, p.278).

Control over Sahar paved the road for the Omanis to force the Portuguese out of Muscat. In 1648, they assaulted that city; and after huge pressures, the Portuguese agreed to sign a treaty with them. However, the Portuguese failure to comply with the treaty and the death of Imam Nasir bin Murshid, in 1649, delayed their expulsion from Muscat until 1650 when Sultan bin Saif, who succeeded Imam Nasir successor, could drive them out during that year (Al Hamadani, 1984;Barthurst, 1967; pp104-107.Al Ojaili, 1987, pp48-56).

The political developments in Oman and the incidents accompanying them during 1624-1650 were not far from the economic aspects: both navigational and trade. Those aspects formed an essential part of Imam Nasir Bin Murshid's interests, which is clear in the treaties concluded with the Portuguese, as they targeted the freeing of trade and navigation from their dominance. This economic aspect was also encouraged throughout his ruling span.

Imam Nasir bin Murshid insisted on making the Omanis traders benefit from the main ports such as Muscat and Sahar after the first victory he achieved over the Portuguese in 1632. Under the peace treaty, he required them to treat the Omanis well when they come to Muscat and Mutrah for trade and other activities. He further required them to return the money they had previously robbed from some tribes. (Ibn Qayser, P. 34-40;IbnRuzaiq, P. 215).

In intensified assaults made by the Omanis on the Portuguese at their strongholds, such as Muscat and Sahar, the Portuguese showed no ability to confront such assaults, so they accepted peace once again in 1634. At that time, they accepted conditions, including demolition of fortifications they established outside Muscat and Mutrah and allowing the Omanis to trade freely in the territories controlled by the Portuguese (Al Salmi, P. 11).

The last condition shows that it was very important for Imam Nasir to open Oman's trade points, as the Portuguese occupation of Muscat adversely affected the Omani trade. Therefore, when the Imam had the first opportunity, he cared to open those points (Al Sayyar, 1975, p57).

Ending Muscat's blockade and imposing conditions, mostly related to navigation and trade, for peace with the Portuguese might have been Imam Nasir bin Murshid's greatest achievement prior to his death in 1648. Those conditions included:



1. Free navigation of Omani ships in the Arabian Gulf without being monitored by the Portuguese ships, except in case of returning to Muscat port. In that case, they need to obtain the permission of the Portuguese garrison.
2. To exempt Omanis who come to Muscat from all kinds of taxes, whether in form of customs or personal taxes, in case of goods importation to and exportation from Muscat.
3. Muscat would be a free trade city for all nationalities with no restrictions (Foster, P. 64).

The second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century was a new era in Oman's political and trade history due to its liberation from the Portuguese control. The Ya'arob Imams dedicated their efforts for the domestic reformation and chasing Portuguese at their sites in India and East Africa. They further made great efforts to establish a great marine force that reached its peak in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

## **2.2 Sultanbin Saif (1649-1668)**

Sultan bin Saif, a cousin of Imam Nasir bin Murshid (1649-1668), was the first Imam to rule Oman during its liberation from the Portuguese control. After Oman had been liberated by him from the Portuguese, Sultan found his homeland in need for building a marine power to protect its coasts and marine trade from the Portuguese attacks that did not stop throughout the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

During Imam Sultan time, several plans were also made for marine campaigns to chase the Portuguese at their strongholds in India and East Africa. The first one of those campaigns was in 1655 when an Omani fleet attacked Bombay. Another fleet headed to East Africa and attacked Mombasa taking control and appointing an Arab ruler over it (Sultanate of Oman, 1980, p64).

Similar campaigns were made in 1660 and 1668 to East Africa and India, but they were countered by Portuguese ones, not against the Omani military forces, but against the main cities of Oman, especially Muscat (Barthurst, 1967; pp.120-123; Al Ojaili, 1987; pp.66-69).

In addition to being busy with marine operations against the Portuguese, Imam Sultan made great efforts in the domestic formation. During his regime, Oman saw great progress

and prosperity, especially after it had successfully opened its marine entry points. Ibn Ruzaiq summarized that regime by saying: “Oman was constructed during his time and prospered in his regime. Prices were lowered, travels became good and traders made profits... Imam Sultan used to do business, which exposed him to criticism by resentful people (Ibn Ruzaiq, 1984; p291).

Imam Sultan made similar efforts to boost the external trade movement. Those efforts were with the Dutch rather than English because the latter wanted to establish a fort in Muscat to be used as domicile for an English garrison consisting of 100 soldiers so it would be a port for their ships, hub for their trade and a way to push Persia against their rivals, the Dutch. Those offers were not accepted by Oman’s Imams who refused to let any foreign troops settle in their country (Al Sayyar, p.169;Qasim, 1985; p110).

After the Portuguese had been forced out in 1653, a rumor in Muscat had it that the Omanis were willing to establish an alliance with the Dutch to collect, on behalf of the Imam, ordinary taxes levied on Marine transportation in the Arabian Gulf. They were the taxes that used to be collected by the Portuguese before 1650. Although that rumor was untrue, it indicated the great reputation the Omanis started to gain amongst traders in the Region (Slot, 1993; p175).

Should the nature of trade relations between the Dutch and Oman is just a rumor, there was evidence that those relations went so far during Imam Sultan’s regime. In 1665, the Dutch sent their delegate Hindreel Van Dick from Bandar Abbas to Imam Sultan to discuss the establishment of a branch of the Dutch Company in Muscat. Imam responded to them: "We received your delegate, stating the wish to send a person to our commercial city, Muscat, provided that he would use for that project some ships and boats to carry goods from and to the city for trade purposes. He added that he would bring us some individuals from you to reside in our commercial city to perform services you need. We would like to respond to your request by assuring you that our commercial city is yours, and our friendship and alliance feelings would be mutual.... We would be happy to establish a branch for you in our commercial city” (Slot; pp179-180).

The message shows Imam Sultan’s stand towards the Dutch. He wanted to make an alliance with them due to his fear of the Portuguese, and because the Dutch were reputable in

the Arabian Gulf Region. However, the Imam's decision to raise the custom fees to a too high level prevented the Dutch attempts to establish an agency for them in Muscat, not to mention that their situation in Bandar Abbas became better (Slot; pp180-181).

### **2.3. Bil'arab bin Sultan (1668-1681)**

During the regime of Imam Bil'arab bin Sultan (1668-1681), we could find that he also cared to chase the Portuguese at their strongholds in both India and East Africa, and he was interested in trade and in boosting it too. In regard to the first matter, Alexander Hamilton said "in around 1670, two years after Bil'arab rose to power, Muscat Arabs came in a commercial fleet and arrived at night to the west of the Island (Diu) and were unnoticed. On the early morning, the City's gates were opened and they entered with no resistance" (Miles, 1986, p.208).

The Portuguese wanted to respond to the Omanis by occupying Muscat, so they sent a fleet for this purpose in 1673. However, that fleet failed to achieve its goals and retreated out of fear of being attacked by the Omani fleet (Al Sayyar, p.74). In the following year, as a reaction to the Portuguese assault on his homeland, Imam Bil'arab sent his fleet to Bassein, a Portuguese hub on the West India Coast, where 600 Omanis went on and gained spoils while the Portuguese did not dare to stop them (Bathurst, pp.131-132; Miles, p.209). Shortly thereafter, those Omani marine campaigns stopped in the Indian Ocean due to the civil war that started in Oman between the brothers, Bil'arab and Saif, especially when the latter gained a significant popularity, thanks to his strong character and having a spirit of adventure as then known amongst Omanis (Miles, p.209).

It is worth mentioning that the Dutch attempts to establish commercial relations with Oman continued during Bil'arab's regime. They sent some of their ships there, but those relations were not revived even though a Dutch mission delegation arrived to Oman in 1672, because the Dutch were not sure whether to develop their hub in Bandar Abbas or find an alternative in Muscat, before they finally decided to take the first choice (Slot, pp.186-187).

### **2.4. Saif Ben Sultan's (1681-1711):**

During Imam Saif Ben Sultan's regime (1681-1711), Oman reached its power peak, both politically and commercially. Imam Saif took care of and developed the fleet making it

the strongest local fleet in the Region in terms of strength and number. Omanis reached an unprecedented level (Miles, 1986). Hamilton estimated the Omani war fleet during that regime to be one ship carrying 74 cannons, two ships with 60 cannons, one ship with 50 cannons, 18 smaller ships with 12-32 cannons and some paddle ships with 4-8 cannons each (Hamilton, 1744,p.76).

The Omani-Portuguese conflict was intensified during Imam Saif's Regime, who actively attacked the Portuguese in India and East Africa coasts. In 1649, an Omani fleet attacked the Portuguese bases in India; and in 1695, the Omanis attacked King Port, the last European stronghold in the eastern coast of the Arabian Gulf. He also warned the European powers of offering any help to Persians who wanted to attack Muscat with a support from the English (Lockhart, 1958; pp.67;Miles, pp.210).

In 1696, Imam Saif led a great fleet carrying 3000 men to attack the Portuguese in Mombasa Castle that was protected by 2500 men, and he besieged them. In 1698, the Omanis vanguards started entering into the Castle. Before the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the African East Coast cities started to gradually fall under the control of the Omanis (Coupland, 1968; pp67-68)

According to numerous European contemporary sources and documents, there was no doubt that the Omanis became the masters of the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and even the European powers present in the Region became afraid of them (Al Sayyar, pp.78-79).

It was normal that the rise of Omanis marine power would make it more respected in trade field. A Portuguese writer stated that the Portuguese were no longer dangerous rivals for the Omanis in any trade field in the East (Marques, 1972; p.338).

Thus, it is clear that Portugal's success in the trade activity was limited – as mentioned above – and their influence on both the European-Asian trade and on the Asian trade field was insignificant. The Portuguese could not make a significant change in the Asian trade, which maintained its essential characteristics. “The late years of the 16<sup>th</sup> century did not only see a decrease in the Portuguese vessels that crossed the Cape of Good Hope, they also saw degradation in the efficiency of such vessels. During the 80 years from 1500 to 1580, 620 vessels crossed the Cape of Good Hope, and only 325 of which could manage to return safely to Portugal, while 256 vessels remained in the East and 39 others went missing. During 1580-

1612, 186 vessels sailed from Portugal via the Cape of Good Hope to the East, and only 100 of which returned sound to Portugal, while 57 vessels went missing and 29 others remained in the East. During the first period, 93% of vessels returned safely, while only 69% of those vessels did so in the second period.” (Parry, 1965).

### **3. European powers**

When the Portuguese power in the East, especially in the Arabian Gulf, declined and became militarily, politically and commercially weak, from the early years of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, it became easy for the rival and local powers, whether states or companies, to take them out of their way. Those challenges and the confrontation of the rival powers with the Portuguese on one hand and with each other on the other hand, as well as the emerging alliances led to political situations in the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century resulted in key events such as the elimination of the Portuguese presence in the Region.

During the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, trade was conducted by several commercial and monopolizing companies, including two giants that played a key role, not only for their countries' history, but also for Asia and the entire world (Amin, 1987). Those two companies were the English East India Company and Dutch East India Company.

Those companies were successful in the fields where the Portuguese ones failed. Politically, each one of them established a very extensive and solid empire, and their success remained for over a couple of centuries. Economically, they made a significant change not only in the European–Asian trade relations, but also in the Asian trade itself and the overall worldwide economy (Amin, 1987).

Thus, it can be noticed that some other European powers, represented by the previous commercial companies, joined the rivalry in the Arabian Gulf Region, and became a key part of it. The idea of finding a route to the East came to a significant number of the officials in Europe. When the Portuguese discovered & monopolized the Cape of Good Hope route, the Europeans started looking for alternative routes. The English were in the lead to do so (Amin, 1963; p.2) and followed by the Dutch who started competing them and the Portuguese as well (Kareem, P.153). Others such as the Danish and French joined the competition over the Arabian Gulf trade; however, their presence was not effective during the search period, just like their precedents, particularly because they were late to arrive to the Region.

The English went to Russia searching for an alternative route for the Cape of Good Hope. They explored it and decided to trade with it, so they established Russia Company that obtained from the English Government, in 1555, an absolute right to trade with Russia (Amin, 1963; pp1-2).

Following the establishment of Russia Company, the English efforts were directed towards starting trading with India via Russia and Iran. During 1561-1600, they made several campaigns to achieve that, but they failed, as they found out that the land routes were too difficult and impassable (Amin, 1963; pp2-3).

Both English and Dutch companies captured sites in the East where they established commercial hubs or factories (Amin, 1987). While their positions were getting stable and stronger, the Portuguese were getting weak, and they were no longer considered as a significant challenge for either side after they had been defeated by the allied powers (Amin, 1987).

There was another reason for the superiority of both East Indian companies, the Dutch and British ones over the Portuguese India Company. They were superior in both coordination and cooperation with respect to the imperialistic state activities and with the traders and agents who were the pioneers of the capitalism trade. They marketed their goods and created local markets and distribution network across the Region. Therefore, we should look closely at the history of building the role played by both Dutch and English companies and the position they had in Asia economies (Prakash, 1982), which was lacked by the Portuguese who started dealing with representatives or agents of a heavily armed military state. Prices were fixed under formal agreements between the states, and trade was legalized by the Portuguese without any change in the economic and political relations at the domestic level.

Hence, it can be said that the European companies and imperialistic government coordinated their policies together to serve the economic capitalism approach to gain profits in a mindful highly proficient manner in employing the funds, economic and financial resources in order to generate those profits and rack a capital in contrary to the Portuguese military aggression and violence while abstaining from employing those funds in an industrial production; instead, they were spent on unnecessary luxury.

After the Portuguese became weak, the Dutch replaced them in competing the English in all trade fields of the East, especially in the Arabian Gulf Region. They increased their influence on Persia by various legal and illegal means (Lorimer, 1967, Fahmi, 1983). They established a trade hub in Bandar Abbas and started competing the English in politics, and even surpassed, them in trade. In spite of the agreement between the English and the Shah on sharing taxes evenly, the Dutch entered with their goods into Bandar Abbas, and refused to pay any taxes or fees, which deprived the English of their share of those sources (Amin, 1977).

In 1627, the Dutch could weaken the English East India Company position in Persia. They took away from the Company a major part of the silk trade. In 1640, they took the lead in the Arabian Gulf using techniques like bribing the Persian officials, speculations and force (Lorimer, 1967; p.64 Amin, 1977; p.18, Fahmi, 1983; p.17).

According to Bathurst, an alliance was almost made between the Omani and Dutch fleets to face the Portuguese; however, it has never come into force because the Dutch were thinking at that time in a mutual alliance with the Safavids against Arabs of Oman (Miles, 1986; Al Rabei, 1989). It was not executed, which indicates the Dutch were not sure then and were settled in a single political line.

In the beginning, the Dutch-Omani relation was somehow friendly, perhaps due to having the Portuguese as a mutual enemy, which was clear when the Dutch expressed their joy for driving the Portuguese out of Muscat (Al Rabei, 1989).

In 1651, Imam Saif bin Sultan made a great offer to the Dutch to secure a land route for transporting their goods to Basra as an alternative for Bandar bin Abbas. However, the Dutch East India Company's agent thankfully refused that offer (Al Rabei, 1989). That Dutch stand was probably taken due to their strong relation with Persia and because they were afraid that Shah Abbas II's interest would turn to the English.

The Dutch prosperous trade became clear, thanks to the increase in the trade and ships that have reached the Arabian Gulf and Persia since 1650, which expresses power and great financial and commercial capabilities enjoyed by the Dutch. A Dutch fleet consisting of ten ships with a black pepper shipment estimated to be 1.500.00 million pounds arrived to Bandar

Abbas and sold immediately. The Dutch could manage to pay for the silk they bought in Persia from the money they received for the sale of the black pepper (Bruce, 1968).

Due to their tough competition for taking control over the Arabian Gulf, the English and Dutch could not completely wipe the Portuguese out of the Region. Furthermore, the Persians failed to chase them after the fall of Hormuz. They occupied a new site on the Arabian Gulf coast; it was Muscat. They solidly fortified and made it a hub for their trade activities. They maintained their influence there until they were forced out by the Omanis who formed a major, respected force in the Region (Fahmi, 1983).

It can be said that trade activities in the East turned, in the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, from the Portuguese to the Dutch and English companies without passing by the Arabs. However, the Portuguese trade remained, albeit below its past levels. The Portuguese merchant vessels frequently headed to the Portuguese agency in King Island (Lorimer, 1967); i.e., the commercial monopoly did not change with the elimination of the Portuguese; it rather continued under a new disguise at the time of the Omani trade activity emergence during Al-Yueariba's age as competitors, as stated above. However, it did not keep going as it ceased to exist by the end of Al-Yueariba's State, while the European monopoly remained until the end of World War I when the United States of America emerged as a new and powerful partner. Before the British withdrawal, Japan, China and Germany became powerful partners in the Arabian Gulf trade, while the people of the Region were unable to internally control the trade activity, as it was externally imposed upon them, which makes it among the significant challenges of this time.

## **Conclusion:**

Through the study of the trade of the Ya'ariba state and relations with European powers during the seventeenth century, the following conclusions have been reached:

1. The geographic location of Oman makes it a strategic center of a major significance both regionally and internationally. Thanks to that location, Oman has access to the Arabian Sea on one hand, and controls the entrance of the Arabian Gulf on the other hand. Oman is also located in the middle of the navigation lines that lead to Iraq, Persia, Asia and Europe, which gives Oman the opportunity to be in connection with the outer world and have good trade relations that would subsequently have an impact on its economy over the ages.



2. The Portuguese controlled the trade in the eastern region in general, and in the Arabian Gulf in particular, using several methods and techniques to achieve their monopolistic goals. The Gulf Arabs' efforts changed from trade activity to resistance of the Portuguese throughout the occupation period until the time of liberation, which was followed by a rivalry with other European forces, namely the Dutch and English forces, which are explained and detailed by this Research.

3. Undoubtedly, this part of the Gulf history needs more deepened studies to reveal the uncovered matters and refute allegations by some European historians.

## References:

- Amin, A, (1973); Arabian Tribes' Role in Stopping the European Expansion in the Arabian Gulf in the 17th and 18th Centuries, International Conference Academy of History, (Baghdad).
- Amin, A, (1977); British Interests in the Arabian Gulf 1747-1778, Translated by Hashem KazimLazim, Publications of Arabian Gulf Studies Center of Basra University, (Al Irshad Press, Baghdad).
- Amin, A, (1987); New Vision on the Portuguese Political, Military and Commercial Achievements in Asia, A Study on the Portuguese Empire Fall and Decline Factors, (Ras Al Khaima Historical Seminar Research, August), Part II.
- Al-Azkawi, S. (1986); Oman History Quoted from Reveal of Sadness Gathering the News of the Nation, Investigation by Abdel MajeedHasib Al Qaisi, Arab Record Press, Cairo, 2nd Edition.
- Barthurst (1967) ؛ The Ya'rubī Dynasty of Oman, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Lincare College, (Oxford University).
- Bruce, John, (1968). Annals of the East India Company, 1600-1797-8, (Germany).
- Coupland, R.; (1968) East Africa and its Invaders, (Oxford).
- Al-Ediros, M. H, Arabian Gulf Economic History: Arabian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Economic History in Modern Age, 1513-1914, (UAE).
- Fahmi, M. A-, (1983); Al Qasimi's Maritime Activity and Relations with Domestic and Foreign Powers, 1747-1853, Ras Al Khaimah.
- Foster, William, The English Factories in India 1618-1668, and (13 vols).
- Great Britain, India Office, Marine Records, vol. 891, 15 August, 1792.
- Kazem, B. (2004): Trade in Oman during the reign of Mr. Saeed bin Sultan and his relations with foreign countries, Journal of DhiQar University, Issue 1, Volume 1.
- Al-Khateeb M. A, (1981); International Competition in the Arabian Gulf, 1622-1763, Contemporary Library, Saida, Beirut.

- Lockhart, L, (1958). The fall of the Safavid Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia, (Cambridge).
- Lorimer, J.G., (1967); Arabian Gulf Manual, Historical & Geographic Division, Translated by (Qatar Ruler Office), 14 Volumes, Doha, Diwan Office.
- Al-Maani. A. (2001); Trade and Navigation in the Arabian Gulf during the Seventeenth Century, Department of Culture and Information, Sharjah.
- Marques, (1972) ؛ History of Portugal, (London).
- Miles, C.P. (1986); Arabian Gulf States and Tribes, Translated by Mohammad Amin Abdulla, (Amon Press, Cairo, 3rd Edition).
- Al-Ojaili,G. M (1987); Al-Yueariba dynasty rise and fall in Oman, 1624-1749; A Study in Political History, unpublished master thesis in modern history, presented to the Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Arab League, Historical Studies Section (Baghdad), October.
- Olivier, (1988): Olivier's Journey to Iraq 1794-1796, Translated by Yousef Ji, Iraqi Scientific Academy Press, Baghdad.
- Parry. J.H, (1965): Europe and Wider World 1415-1750, London.
- Pires Tome, (1944). The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, an account of the east from the red sea to Japan in 1512-1515, ed. by A. Cortesao, (London).
- Qasim, J. Z, (1985): Arabian Gulf: Study on UAE History in the European First Expansion Age 1507-1840, (Dar Al FikrArabai, Cario).
- Ibn Qaysar, A., Biography of the Just Imam Nasir bin Murshid, Investigation by Abdul Majid Hasib Al Qaisi, (Sultanate of Oman, D.T.).
- Al-Rubaie, H. A ،(1989): Invaders in the Gulf, Dar Al-Kutub for Printing and Publishing, Mosul.
- Al-Salmi, N, (1947): Notable Biography of Oman People, Salafi Press, Cairo.
- Al-Salmi, A, Oman Marine Renaissance, (Cairo D.T.).
- Al-Sayyar,A, (1975); Al-Yueariba State in Oman and East Africa, Dar Al Quds, Beirut, 1st Edition.

- Slot, B.G. (1993); Gulf Arabs 1602-1784, Translated by Aida Khouri, Cultural Academy of Abu Dhabi, 2nd Edition.
- Sultanate of Oman, (1980); Ministry of Information, Oman's Navy Glories, (Arab Record Press, Cairo, 2nd Edition).
- Wilson, A. T. (1982); History of the Gulf, translated by Muhammad Amin Abdullah, (Arab Register Press, 2nd Edition).
- Ibn Zuraiq, H. M, (1984): Glowing Beam on Oman's Imams, Investigation by Abdul MunemAmer, Amoun Press, Cairo.
- Ibn Zuraiq, H. M, (1984); Busaid Dynasty, Investigation by Abdul MunemAmer and Mohammad Mursi Abdulla, (Amoun Press, Cairo, 2nd Edition).
- Tahir, H. (2020). Mechanisms for enhancing social support and reducing school bullying among primary school students in government schools. (In Arabic) Fayoum University Journal of Educational and Psychological Sciences, 14 (11), 1017-1046.